Anyone who spends enough time standing before licensing committees, navigating the granular nuances of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 on behalf of the trade, eventually notices a dissonance. There is a widening gap between the theoretical framework of the Act and its practical application in the committee room.

We all accept the foundational premise of civic licensing. It is an administrative, forward-looking regime designed to protect the public. The statutory fit and proper test is fundamentally concerned with whether a person should hold or continue to hold a licence, rather than providing a general power to punish them for past conduct. Yet, observing the mechanics of committee decisions across various local authorities, there is an often unchallenged drift toward quasi-judicial punishment.

This raises a slightly uncomfortable but necessary legal question for our industry. Are Scottish licensing authorities routinely acting ultra vires by policing statutory offences under the guise of local licence conditions?

The Punitive vs. Preventative Paradox

To understand the boundaries of a licensing authority’s power, we have to look at the anatomy of a suspension. When a suspension is handed down in the heat of the moment following a complaint, the justification given by the committee is often heavily anchored in retrospective bad behaviour.

Too often, there is no clear corrective roadmap. The committee does not explain what the suspension is intended to achieve, what remedial action is required or why that action requires the driver to remain off the road.

Without a corrective intent or a remedial pathway, a suspension fundamentally ceases to be a preventative measure. It becomes a block of time served off the road. It operates, in every practical sense, as a punitive sanction.

The Scottish alcohol licensing regime has already grappled with this problem, and the core administrative principles have obvious relevance to civic licensing in my opinion. In Lidl UK GmbH v Glasgow City Licensing Board [2013], the Court of Session was unequivocal in finding that a licensing board’s role is not to punish past misdeeds. A suspension must have a genuine regulatory purpose. It cannot lawfully be imposed simply to punish past misconduct where there is no continuing problem which suspension can address.

Sheriff Paul Pender reinforced this logic in Nelson v Renfrewshire Licensing Board [2013]. In that case, a suspension applied after the licence holder had already dismissed the offending staff was overturned. The board had erred in law because there was no continuing risk that a period of suspension could cure. The administrative necessity had evaporated, leaving only a punitive shell.

Applying this doctrine to civic committees exposes a stark fragility in how they regulate drivers. If a private hire driver with an unblemished history faces a single, isolated complaint, what exactly is a suspension attempting to correct? If there is no established pattern of behaviour, no evidence suggesting a likelihood of repetition and no ongoing risk to mitigate, a suspension imposed without an identifiable continuing risk or remedial purpose risks becoming a semantic veil for punitive action, rather than a genuine exercise of the fit and proper test.

The Ultra Vires Risk of Duplicated Offences

This punitive mindset is not merely a cultural habit of elected councillors; it can also be facilitated by the way local authorities draft their licence conditions. Take, for instance, a common condition found in local licensing regimes: “The driver of a private hire car shall not ply for hire.”

On a superficial level, this looks like standard regulatory housekeeping. However, that raises a more fundamental question about the legal foundation of the condition. Conduct involving the unlawful operation of taxis or the picking up of passengers by private hire cars is already addressed through offences in section 21 of the 1982 Act, yet local authorities may also impose conditions regulating that same conduct.

By drafting a local licence condition that directly mirrors a statutory offence created by primary legislation, authorities risk creating a parallel enforcement route which can blur the boundary between regulatory action and criminal punishment.

When a single complaint of plying for hire is brought to committee, there is a risk that councillors are placed in the same retrospective posture criticised in Lidl and Nelson. Instead of being asked to address an ongoing licensing risk, they may effectively be asked to determine what happened in the past and impose a consequence for it.

None of this means that criminal conduct is irrelevant to licensing. A licensing committee is plainly entitled to consider conduct which may also constitute an offence when assessing whether a person remains fit and proper. The question is what the committee is doing with that information. Is it using the conduct to assess an ongoing licensing risk, or is it using the licensing process to punish the conduct itself?

The important question, therefore, is not simply whether a licence condition overlaps with a statutory offence. It is how that condition is then used. A licensing condition cannot transform a licensing committee into a criminal court, and the existence of a regulatory condition does not remove the need for a committee to identify a genuine licensing purpose for any action it takes.

The Procedural Bleed and the Subversion of Justice

When we allow local licence conditions to duplicate criminal offences, we invite a dangerous procedural bleed that fundamentally alters the landscape of enforcement. This creates three immediate structural hazards.

First, a misallocation of investigative powers where we end up with council enforcement officers being tasked with investigating criminality. This risks blurring the respective roles of licensing enforcement and criminal enforcement.

Secondly, the evidential position is also fundamentally different. A criminal prosecution requires the Crown to establish guilt to the criminal standard. A licensing committee deciding whether a licence should be suspended is operating within an administrative framework and does not determine criminal guilt. The danger arises when the committee effectively treats the licensing process as a substitute for prosecution, reaching a conclusion about alleged criminal conduct and imposing a livelihood-threatening consequence without first asking what regulatory risk remains.

Lastly, in extreme cases, the different evidential framework can allow serious consequences to follow from allegations which have never been tested through the criminal justice process.

Restoring the Boundaries

When a committee suspends a licence without attaching a corrective, forward-looking pathway, the result is punishment. When licensing authorities draft conditions that replicate statutory offences, they create an additional enforcement route which can facilitate that punitive drift if it is used without a genuine regulatory purpose. That also risks encouraging committees to act as though they were makeshift criminal courts. It is therefore important that we critically assess these overlapping enforcement routes.

Civic licensing needs to return exclusively to its administrative, preventative roots. Not simply as an exercise of regulatory hygiene, but to preserve the proper boundary between civic regulation and criminal justice, ensuring that the trade is regulated through the statutory licensing framework rather than through administrative punishment which properly belongs to the criminal justice system.